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not free to contract away its employment prerogatives. Any question on this
point which may arise from the reading of the new provision is quickly dis-
pelled by reference to the report of the House and ,Senate Conference Com-
mittee on the bill. 11 ... Nothing in such provision is intended to restrict the
applicability of the hiring hall provisions enunciated in the Mountain Pacific
case (119 N.L.R.B. 883, 893)... .'3 The task of properly implementing the
basic objectives of the Act remains the province of the Board. In the hiring
hall area, the task cannot be considered complete by simply following the rula
of .Mountaiii Pacific.
ALmcADER MANSoN
ANNER OF PUBLICATION DETERMINATIVE OF ACTION FOR INVASION 01
PRIVACY
It is the accepted procedure, and rightly so, that any discussion of the
right of privacy start with a reference to the law review article by Warren
and Brandeis which has been widely acknowledged to be the birthplace of the
right of privacy.' Prior to the publication of the article, no right of privacy
was recognized by the common law. It was the purpose of the authors to con-
sider whether the then existing law afforded a principle which could properly
be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual, and, if it did, to determine
the nature and extent of such protection.2 They concluded that the law afforded
such a principle.3 New York, the first state to consider the existence of the
right, rejected its existence.4 Shortly thereafter, however, Georgia held such
a right existed and,5 currently, over twenty states recognize and protect the
right of privacy, while three states, including New York, have adopted a limited
statutory right of privacy.6
It is not surprising that the existence of the right received such ready
recognition. In 1890, Warren and Brandeis said that "Of the desirability-
indeed of the necessity-of some such protection, there can, it ii believed, be
no doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. " r Those same abuses exist today, and, along with
technical advances in the field of communications, and the willingness of the
courts to recognize a cause of action for mental disturbance, account for the
rapid, and almost inevitable,8 growth of the right of privacy.
Today the courts are no longer faced with the problem of the existence
35. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 3186 (1959).
1. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
2. Id. at 197.
3. Id. at 206.
4. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
5. Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company, 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
6. Prosser, Torts, 636-637 (2d ed. 1955) ; see N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51.
7. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
8. 1 Harper and James, Torts, § 683 (1956).
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of the right, but with its dimensions. These dimensions should be prescribed
by the purpose of the right, which purpose was visualized by Warren and
Brandeis as follows:
"The design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose
affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged
into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons,
whatsoever their position or station, from having matters which they
may properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will.
It is the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which is repre-
hended, and to be, so far as possible, prevented." 9
They defined the right of privacy simply as the right to be let alone.
The right of privacy has a number of different facets. Recovery has
generally been granted for (1) the invasion of plaintiff's physical solitude
(e.g., wiretapping, eavesdropping), (2) publicity which violates ordinary de-
cencies (e.g., the unwarranted publishing of personal information about the
plaintiff), (3) putting plaintiff in a false position (e.g., the unauthorized signing
of one's name to a petition), and (4) the appropriation of some element of
plaintiff's personality for a "commercial" use (e.g., the use of one's picture
in an advertisement).1° Confusion has arisen from the failure to distinguish
this latter category from the property right inherent in one's name or likeness.
The right of privacy, however, is a strictly personal right based on the interest one
has in living his life out of the public view. When the actor's conduct is such
that it can reasonably be expected to interfere with the mental and emotional
tranquility of a person of ordina ry sensibilities, the plaintiff's right of privacy
has been invaded and the showing of special damages is not necessary.1' Be-
cause of the nature of the right, truth is no defense in the case of a publication,
nor is the absence of malice or wilfulness on the part of the actor.
The right, however, is not absolute. The principal limitation on the right
to be free from undesired publicity is the defendant's privilege to publish matter
which is of sufficient public interest.L 2 Thus, the right does not exist in the
dissemination of news and other information of public interest, nor in the discus-
sion of events in the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest,
permanent or temporary.
This limitation was carefully examined by the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania in the case of Aquino v. Bulletin Company.'3 A common law action for
the unwarranted invasion of.the right of privacy is recognized in Pennsylvania,' 4
but, as the Court stated ".... we have only begun to draw the lines bounding
the right."'15 Because of the limited development of this area of the law, the
9. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214-215.
10. Prosser, supra note 6, at 637-640.
1k- Restatement, Torts, § 867, comment d (1939).
12. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 214.
13. -- Pa. Super. -, 154 A.2d 422 (1959).
14. Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co, 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644 (1956).
15. Aquino v. Bulletin Company, supra note 13, at 425.
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Court considered the status of the right in many of the states which have spoken
on the subject, in an effort to "draw the line" judiciously.' 6
The Aquino case dealt with the publication of an article in The American
Weekly, a supplement in defendant's newspaper, The Sunday Bulletin. 7 The
article was a story about the unfortunate romance, marriage and divorce of
Teresa Aquino, plaintiff's daughter. The title of the article was "Marriage for
Spite." It told how Teresa's suitor had persuaded her to secretly marry him
and then, three days later, revealed that he never had any intention of living
with her or accepting her as his wife, but had married her merely to spite the
plaintiffs who had tried to turn their daughter against him. Teresa immediately
filed for divorce and this was reported in the newspapers, as was the subsequent
final decree. The plaintiffs were referred to in an opinion written by a Judge
of the Court of Common Pleas on a legal point involved in the divorce case.
This opinion was published in the local law reports.' 8
The facts contained in the Bulletin were substantially true and the Court
acknowledged the basic events involved to be newsworthy, i.e., of legitimate
public concern. But the article was in the nature of a story and not a news
article. It was published in the Sunday supplement on a page which was
dominated by a melodramatic illustration, across which was written the title
of the story. The style in which the article was written was not that of a news
story, but the facts, although basically correct, were embellished and fiction-
alized by the author. The article mentioned the parents by name and related
their part in, and reactions to, the whole affair. As a result of this publication,
the parents brought this action for the unwarranted invasion of their own right
of privacy and received a jury verdict of five thousand dollars each.
To state the conflict in its broadest terms, the Court in the Aquino case
had to reconcile the right of privacy with the freedom of the press-the indi-
vidual's interest with that of the public. The aspect of the right of privacy
involved here is the individual's interest in not having disclosed to the public
facts about his personal affairs which would cause him humiliation, embarrass-
ment, or, at least, annoyance. The community's interest is twofold, embracing
both the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the press and the right of the
public to be informed. It is in this area of attempted reconciliation that the
law of privacy is found to be the moit confused.' 9 This is not surprising con-
sidering the difficulty involved in formulating a rule or set of rules which
would be applicable to the variant fact situations. This difficulty, in fact, was
foreseen in the original work on the subject:
"Any rule of liability adopted must have in it an elasticity which shall
take account of the varying circumstances of each case-a necessity
16. Compare Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F.2d 974, 975 (3d Cir. 1951).
17. Edition of December 3, 1950, of which 695,423 copies were distributed.
18. Masciocchi v. Masciocchi, 72 Pa. D.&C. 257 (1950).
19. Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces v. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 Minn.
L. Rev. 734, 743 (1948).
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which unfortunately renders such a doctrine not only more difficult of
application, but also to a certain extent uncertain in its operation and
easily rendered abortive."20
The Restatement recognizes the existence of a right of privacy and states
that recovery will be had for an unreasonable and serious interference with the
right. It is up to the jury to determine whether the intrusion went beyond the
bounds of decency and whether the defendant should have known that the
plaintiff would be justified in feeling seriously hurt by the publication.?1 Al-
though a test of reasonableness is suggested, there seems to be no real balanc-
ing of interests in the courts once an item has been designated as being of
legitimate public concern. Such a designation has the effect of an almost ab-
solute privilegei rather than being a mere factor (concededly an extremely
important one) to be considered with a number of others in the balancing of
interests.23 This shortcoming is avoided if a balancing takes place in determin-
ing what is of legitimate public concern. This determination, however, is usu-
ally a rather one-sided inquiry into whether there exists a general public in-
terest which,2 4 in turn, is governed by "the mores of the community. 25 Al-
though the courts sometimes state that the public's interest must be "meritori-
ous"26 or "rightful", 27 the only real limitation seems to be a prohibition against
"outrageous" revelations.2 8 While it is true that the courts are not concerned
with establishing canons of good taste for the press or public, 9 it is questionable
whether the courts should accept, as demonstrative of current mores, what the
public will read with "interest", 30 rather than inquiring into the community
20. Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 215-216.
21. Restatement, Torts, § 867 (1939).
22. "Contrary to the expectations of Warren and Brandeis, public interest in news
has provided a virtually impregnable defense to the right of privacy." Ludwig, supra
note 19, at 744.
23. A balancing of interests should include a consideration of the following questions:
Is the newsworthy event presented as a mere vulgar curiosity or is there some
public benefit in its dissemination? How current is the news? Is plaintiff the
primary subject of the publication? If not, what is the relationship of the plaintiff
to the subject? Is the plaintiff a public personage or an unknown? What is the
effect of the publication on plaintiff, subjectively, and in his relations with
others? How foreseeable was this effect? Did the publication use plaintiff's name
or picture, and how extensive was the use? What was the medium of publication,
its surroundings, and the necessity of using a manner of publication more offen-
sive than others? Did the publication deviate from the true facts, even if only
by inference? Was the publisher's motive to inform or educate, or purely to make
a profit, or to intentionally damage plaintiff? What effect will a denial of the
privilege have on freedom of the press?
24. "For present purposes news need be defined as comprehending no more than
relatively current events such as in common experience are likely to be of public interest."
Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Company, 251 F.2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1958).
25. "The courts must determine in view of the mores of our culture what are per-
missible inroads upon the privacy of the individual." 1 Harper and James, supra note
8, at 686. See Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corporation, 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir. 1940).
26. Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Company, supra note 24, at 450.
27. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931).
28. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corporation, supra note 25, at 809; Prosser, supra note
6, at 643-644.
29. Aquino v. Bulletin Company, supra note 13, at 425.
30. "The increased circulation of magazines such as 'Confidential' is mute testimony
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feeling towards what ought to be privileged. The curious8 1 the vulgar, the
distorted mind will want "news" of their neighbors' private lives, 32 even if it
means an "expose". But should this type of public interest which is of little
or no social value, and may be in fact harmful to society,33 be covered by the
same near absolute privilege designed to protect the publication of news and
information from which the public benefits? This is the question with which
the Court in the Aquino case had to struggle. It is a question of great diffi-
culty because of the real danger that any limitation is likely to result in an
enfringement of this essential public interest, 34 especially when the line of
demarcation between what should and should not be permitted is so vague.
This difficulty, and danger, was recognized by Warren and Brandeis, 35 as well
as the Pennsylvania Court which stated "Without well defined limitations the
right of privacy might dangerously encroach upon freedom of speech and
freedom of the press. ' 36
Despite these pitfalls, the Aquino case held that if the purpose of the
publication was not the legitimate one of disseminating news but was to amuse
and astonish its readers, the privilege would not automatically attach even
though the basic events involved were newsworthy. This result is an important
step in the direction of limiting the publication of matters of public "interest".
It exposes a feeling that there exist instances, the number of which are limited
to a large extent only by the good taste and charitableness of the publisher,
where some protection should be given private persons involved in news events.
The Aquino case, apparently, was such an instance. As mentioned before, the
events which formed the basis of this article were of legitimate public concern.
The public could be, and in this case was, informed of the basic events by an
ordinary news item. The subsequent publication, in a form which emphasized
the bizarre aspects of the affair, and also delved into the surrounding personal
circumstances, went far beyond the unavoidable invasion of privacy which the
plaintiffs must accept from mere disclosure. This added embarrassment and
humiliation flowed from the manner of publication which was neither necessary
that the public is interested in the kind of news those magazines purvey." Goelet v.
Confidential, Inc., 5 A.D.2d 226, 230, 171 N.Y.S.2d 223, 226-227 (1st Dep't 1958).
31. One court has said that public interest is not to be confused with mere curiosity.
See Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491 (1939).
32. 1 Harper and James, supra note 8, at 686.
33. See Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196.
34. "The public policy involved in leaving unhampered the channels for the circula-
tion of news and information is considered of primary importance . . . . A free press is so
intimately bound up with fundamental democratic institutions that if the right of privacy
is to be extended to cover news items and articles of general public interest, educational
and informative in character, it should be the result of a clear expression of legislative
policy." Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 781-782, 295 N.Y. Supp. 382, 388
(Sup. Ct. 1937).
35. ".... it is only the more flagrant breeches of decency and propriety that could
in practice be reached, and it is not perhaps desirable even to attempt to repress everything
which the nicest taste and keenest sense of the respect due to private life would condemn."
Warren and Brandeis, supra note 1, at 216.
36. Aquino v. Bulletin Company, supra note 13, at 425.
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nor of any social value, except insofar as it helped to keep the newspaper in
business and amused its readers.3" A balancing of the interests involved might
well result in an actionable invasion of privacy, but in order to apply the
Restatement's test, the Court had to devise a way of side-stepping the freedom
of press privilege.
This it did by adopting a "purpose" test as New York had done in Sutton
v. Hearst Corp.38 The article involved there was also a Sunday supplement ac-
* count of a basically newsworthy event. It was necessary for the Court to in-
quire into the purpose with which the article was published since in New York
an action for the invasion of the right of privacy exists only under a statute
which requires a person's name or likeness to be used for advertising purposes
or for purposes of trade.3 9 In determining what uses are "for purposes of
trade", the New York courts have found liability in cases which correspond, in
general, with those in common law jurisdictions.40 The test set forth by the
Appellate Division was as follows:
"It is for the triers of the facts to determine whether the article and its
surrounding illustrations were limited to reporting fairly past or cur-
rent events, whether it is educational or informative, or whether the
primary purpose, as the complaint alleges, was to amuse and astonish
the reading public, not for the legitimate purpose of disseminating
news, but for 'purposes of trade'."'
The actual holding in Sutton, however, was that a motion to dismiss should
be denied because it could be found that the offending article was so fictionalized
as to create a false impression. The dissent in Sutton makes it clear that the
"test" announced by the majority is contrary to New York law if it was meant
to include essentially truthful accounts.12 The Aquino article was "fictionalized"
in the sense that the author used his imagination to embellish and garnish the
basic facts. It does not appear from the opinion, however, that the Court re-
lied on finding the article as a whole to be fictional or misleading in order to
conclude that its purpose was not privileged. Although this approach has oc-
casionally received favorable mention,4 3 the prevailing common law view seems
to be in accord with New York law.
One of the leading cases in this area is Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp.44 The
37. "Few newspapers or news magazines would long surive if they did not publish
a substantial amount of news on the basis of entertainment value of one kind or another."
Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Company, supra note 24, at 451.
38. 277 App. Div. 155, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1950).
39. N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.
40. Prosser, supra note 6, at 641.
41. Sutton v. Hearst Corporation, supra note 37, at 156-157, 98 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234,
235.
42. See LabiWi v. Daily Mirror, Inc., supra note 34.
43. "... the right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information
does not extend to a fictional or novelized representation of a person ...!' Garner v.
Triangle Publications, 97 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Hazlitt v. Fawcitt Pub-
lications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538 (D. Conn. 1953).
44. Supra note 25.
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plaintiff there was a former child prodigy turned recluse who was the subject
of an intimate biographical sketch some thirty years after his withdrawal from
public life. The Second Circuit Court had to determine the position, under
the common law, of five states which recognized the existence of the right of
privacy,45 but had not spoken on the specific problem. A survey of the cases
indicated that "None . . . goes so far as to prevent a newspaper or magazine
from publishing the truth about a person, however intimate, revealing, or harm-
ful the truth may be. Nor are there any decided cases that confer such a
privilege upon the press."'46 In holding that there was no liability since the
plaintiff was a public figure because of the legitimate public concern in whether
he fulfilled his early promise, the Court stated that it regarded the precise
motives of the press as unimportant, and intimated that newsworthiness would
constitute a complete defense unless the community's notions of decency were
outraged. The year before the Aquino decision, in Jenkins v. Dell Publishing
Co.,47 the Third Circuit Court was asked to decide whether the publisher's
"purpose" affected the privilege of publication,48 and, applying what it felt to
be the law of Pennsylvania, reached a different result, viz., that once the character
of an item as news is established, it is neither feasible nor desirable for a court
to make a distinction between news for information and news for entertainment
in determining the extent to which publication is privileged. 49 The Court had
given the conflict of interests careful consideration and felt that any other rule
would dangerously and undesirably obstruct the publisher by compelling him
to speculate as to the value judgments of a judge or a jury with reference to
the kind of reader appeal the item offers.& '0 The result was that plaintiffs, the
family of a victim in a current murder case, could not recover for the publica-
tion of their photograph in connection with an account of the murder in a
detective magazine which, as characterized by the dissent, could be found to
cater to the palates of those who seek morbidity and sensationalism. The
Aquino opinion distinguishes the Jenkins case on the grounds that it dealt with
the publication of a picture and not a fictionalized story. This seems to be a
questionable basis for distinction. A photograph is usually given the same
characterization as the article it illustrates. Thus, the inquiry in both cases
concerned the nature of the article published and the relevance of the pub-
lisher's "purpose" 51.
45. Plaintiff alleged an invasion of his right of privacy in seven of the states in
which the offensive article was published. The determination of liability had to be made
in accordance with the law of each state in which there was a publication. For a discussion
of this problem, see Prosser, Interstate Publications, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959 (1953).
46. Sidis v. F-R. Publishing Company, supra note 25, at 808.
47. Supra note 24.
48. "Indeed, it seems to be the appellants' principal contention that this publication
is not entitled to the privileged status of ordinary news items because its actual or in-
tended appeal is to satisfy a public craving for 'entertainment' rather than to provide
'Information." Jenkins v. Dell Publishing Company, supra note 24, at 451.
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 452.
51. Supra note 24.
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In concluding its opinion in the Aquino case, the Court said: "We realize
that it is extremely difficult to develop a precise and comprehensive rule which
can be applied to a case where liability is based upon the manner in which an
event is presented and not upon publication of the event itself."52 This princi-
ple, that the form rather than the matter of a publication might render it un-
privileged by revealing an unprotected purpose, appears to be a new limitation
on the freedom of the press and, consequently, a further protection for the de-
veloping right of privacy. This is especially clear when the decision is con-
sidered in light of the facts. The article did not attempt to ridicule or degrade
the plaintiffs and, although the facts were embellished, the events were not
distorted. Nor did it appear in a publication devoted solely to reader amuse-
ment, but rather in a newspaper, albeit in the supplement, where the privilege
of publication is given its greatest recognition.5"
The "purpose" test was used in Aquino as a technique to remove the publi-
cation from the category of legitimate public concern. The decision, however,
in effect, brings the law closer to a simple balancing of interests as a test of
liability. This would seem to be a desirable result since it avoids giving every
published item which now considered of legitimate public concern the full
privilege of newsworthiness despite its own particular social value, or lack of
social value. That is, "degrees" of legitimate public concern could be recog-
nized corresponding with the public benefit of each publication, to be balanced
against the individual's interest. Of course this would put an increased burden
on the courts to avoid the danger of infringing on freedom of the press. How-
-ever, the courts have previously handled such situations successfully and
should not avoid the problem because their task is difficult.
The full acceptance and development of the Aquino approach, and its
effect on the privilege and determination of newsworthiness, remain to be
seen. The greatest potential application would seem to be in cases where
the plaintiff has lost his traditional cause of action for the invasion of privacy
by becoming a public figure or by being involved in the public records. While
such persons are undoubtedly newsworthy subjects, this doctrine could be
invoked as a check on the treatment they are accorded by unscrupulous pub-
lishers, as exemplified by magazines which thrive on gossip and sensationalism.
One can also speculate whether any court would be willing to extend this
"manner of presentation" test to the dramatic headlines of tabloids whose
main source of "news" is personalities and their personal affairs.
CaALEs F. G.ANEY
52. Aquino v. Bulletin Company, supra note 13, at 430 (emphasis mine).
53. "The almost absolute privilege conferred on news because of great public concern
in current events and the impossibility of obtaining consent in advance extends almost
to the entire contents of a newspaper. In this atmosphere of immediate public. interest,
the privilege of the front page bulletin is frequently carried over to the weird story in the
Sunday supplement." Ludwig, supra note 19, at 748.
